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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Cr:METllRIES-CIVII. LL\BII.ITIES-TORTS.-Plaintiff sued defendant corporation for malicious prosecution by its sexton and secretary. Deiendant was
organized for cemetery purposes, not for profit, and without capital stock.
The state general code provided that such an association might acquire and
hold not exceeding one hundred acres of land, apd also take any gift or devise, or the income thereof, in trust, "all of which shall be exempt from execution." Held, one justice dissenting, under the maxim "e~pressio uniu~
e~clusio alterfos" the statute expressly excluded other property from execution. Hence defendant, though a charitable organization, was liable in a tort
action. Cantoti Cemetery Association v. Slayman (Ohio, 1918), 121 N. E. 819.
One line of cases holds that there is no tort liability whatsoever of a charitable organization, whether the person injured be a beneficiary, an employe,
or a third person. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254 The basis
of this is that the corporation is merely trustee of a fund for the public bene.fit, that since it may not divert the fund by direct acts, it should not be allowed to do so by indirect. Fordyce v. Library Ass'ti., 79 Ark. 550. These
courts allow only the action against the tortfeasor himself. Perry v. House
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20. That the wrongdoer may often be penniless is the
misfortune of the injured party, since "the law does not undertake to provide a solvent defendant for every wrong done." Vermillion v. T¥oman's
College, 104 S. C. 197. In distinct conflict is the view taken in Glavin v.
Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 4n, where the plaintiff recovered against a
charitable institution for unskilful treatment. Subsequent to this decision,
the Rhode Island legislature created an exemption for hospitals sustained
by charity. Gen. Laws of R. I., Cap. 213, Sec. 3"8. See Parks v. Nortliweslet'_n
U11iv., 218 Ill. .;i8r. Partial exemption obtains in other courts, which hold
that the corporation is liable for the torts of its servants only where it has
failed to use due care in hiring them. The basis of this view may be that the
foundation of the! respondeat superior doctrine is that the servant works for
the master's benefit, and that it cannot be applied where the servant works
instead for the benefit of the public. H eams v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn.
98. There is still another line of cases : that the charitable organization is
liable to employees and third persons, but not to beneficiaries, on the grounds
that one who avails himself of the charity assumes the risks incident thereto.
Dowues v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555. However correct the decision
of the principal case may be as a rule of abstract justice, it is hardly logical
from the course of reasoning laid down by the court. That the legislature
permitted some of defendant's property to be taken on exec11tion may have
been no more than a means of satisfying judgments in contract actions. The
right to sue a charitable organization in contract is well settled. Armstrong
Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81. A situation similar to that in the principal
case arose in Ab~·ton v. Waldon Academy, n8 Tenn. 24 There the charter
of the defendant corporation provided that it might sue and be sued. The
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court denied recovery in tort, on the grounds that there was abundant scope
for the operation of the clause in the charter without interfering with the
principle that a charitable organization could not be sued in tort.
CoM:r.10N CARRitRs-APPLICATION oF HouRs oF S:i;Rv1c:i; ACT To EMl'LOYEts
OF TERMINAL Co.-Does the Hours of Service Act apply to a Terminal Company, operating a union freight station under contracts with ten railroads and
several steamship companies; owning freight sheds and· yards and connecting tracks, also tugs and car floats, but no cars; leasing two switching engines and employing crews, but carrying no passengers, and receiving goods
only as agent of the railroads and steamship lines? Held, that such a company was a common carrier within the meaning of the Act, thus reversing
239 Fed. 287. United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, (U. S.
Supreme Court, March 24, 1919).
The court below held that the switching crews of defendant were clearly
within the object of the Hours of Service Act, but as that act was limited
to "common carriers" the point was too plain to need elaboration that it did
not apply to defendant. The Supreme Court finds it too plain to call for
much elaboration, that this unanimous conclusion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, First Circuit, is wrong. It does not depend on any nice distinctions
-0f definite or corporate power, or of agency, but "whether Congress, in declaring the Hours of Service Act applicable to any common carrier or carriers, their officers, agents and employees, engaged in the transportation of
.passengers or property by railroad, made its prohibitions applicable to" defendant. The decision accords with the general principle that the public is
not concerned with the agencies employed by a carrier to perform its duties,
they are all impressed with the public nature of the carrier, and as to such
public duties, the liability is joint and several. No duty or liability should
be escaped by dividing the service with other agencies. In addition to the
cases cited in the opinion, see such cases as, Christenson v. Americmi E:r·
press Company, 15 Minn. 270 (Express Companies); Robinson v. Southeni
Railroad Company, 40 App. Cas. (D. C.) 549, Ann. Cases, 1914 C 959 (Sleeping Car Companies); C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Association, 247 U. S. 490 (June, 1918, involving separate charges over terminal
tracks).
C.OlltMON CARRitRS-DISCRIMINATION BY GRAN'l.'ING SPECIAL PRIVIL!GJ;S.Plaintiff bought a railway ticket to a station at which his train did not stop.
He brought an action for damages caused by requiring him to change cars
so as to take a train stopping at his station. Held, .that under such circumstances it was the duty of the passenger to stop off and wait for such train.
Defendant company could not stop the other train at that station for plaintiff
without violating the Federal Statute forbidding granting to any person any
privileges in the transportation of persons or property, except such as are
,specified in the tariff. May v. S. A. L. Ry. (S. C. 1918), g6 S. E. 482.
The common law rule that charges must be reasonable did not require
that they should be equal. Fitchburg Ry. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray 393. If the
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charge tc me is reasonable I cannot complain that the charge to you was less,
was the doctrine of the old cases. In Schofield v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 43 Ohio
St. 571, the effect of this doctrine in building up the Standard Oil Company
and in crushing its competitors, led the court severely to limit the doctrine.
It was reviewed in Cook v. C. R. I. & 0. Ry., 81 Ia. 551, with the conclusion
that carriers were not presumed to be in the business of "alms-giving''. The
only reasonable conclusion is that the less rate was reasonable, and the greater
was too much. Judge Landis in U. S. v. C. & A. R31., 148 Fed. 646, took
the ground that "no rate can possibly be reasonable that is higher than anybody else has to pay." Meantime statutes were taking the same direction and
dealing with discriminating service as well as rates. They were not merely
:fixing a maximum rate, but were providing that there should be but one
rate and one set of privileges for all in the same class. The main object of
the acts of 1906 and 19rn was held to be to secure equality of treatment
for all. Adams E:rpress Co. v. Crominger, 226 U. S. 491. A newspaper cciitor. must pay the same cash fare as other passengers, and cannot lawfully
ride on a pass paid for by advertising. McNeil v. D. & C. Ry. Co., 132 N. C.
5rn; C. J. & L. Ry. v. U. S., 219 U. S. 486. Equally forbidden is the issue
of a free pass in settlement of a claim for damages against a railroad. L. &
N. R. C'J. v. ftfattley_. 219 U. S. 467. Nor can a sheriff pay for his rides by
his fees in snits in which the railroad was a party. In a recent case his
removal from office was justified because he made such an arrangement.
Coco v. Oden (La., 1918), 79 So. 287. An agreement to expedite a shipment
is equally within the inhibition. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155;
Clegg v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 203 Fed. 971. See also previous notes, 13
MICH. L. Rsv. 514, 14 M1cH. L. Rsv. 416. In a recent opinion, Mr. Justice
Holmes thinks "the passion for equality sometimes leads to hollow formulas".
In Postal-Tel. Cable Co. v. Tonopah & Tide Water R. Co. (U.S. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 20, 1919), he :finds contracts for exchange services between telegraph
and railroad companies, whether on or off the line, are not within the Act
.of June 18, r9rn, c. 309, Sec. 7, thus reversing the ruling of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and affirming, 241 Fed. 162, 249 Fed. 664
CRIMIN.AI, LAw-CoNsTRuC'l'm !NTF;NT-INvor.uNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.-

Defendant sold to deceased "cream soda'' containing 38% wood alcohol,
which deceased imbibed with fatal effect. The trial court charged, in effect,
that if defendant, without knowledge of its poisonous quality, put wood
alcohol in the soda with intent to make an intoxicating liquor to sell in violation of the laws of the state, he was guilty of manslaughter, and of this
crime the jury found him guilty. Held, no error, the sale of intoxicating
liquor being "not only malum in se, but malltm prohibit11m." State v. Keever,
(N. Car., 1919), 97 S. E. 727.
It is commonly held that, in order that intent to do one act may supply
the criminal intent necessary for conviction of doing another and unintended
act, it is essential that the act intended be wrongful in: itself, not merely prohibited by law. In other words, although no question of moral culpability is
involved where one intentionally does· a prohibited act (Reynolds v. U. S.,
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g8 U. S. r45; U.S. v. Harmo1~, 45 Fed. 414), where such act is done unintentionally there must be moral culpability to constitute crime. Reg. v.
Frankli1i, 15 Cox C. C. 163; Com. v. Adams, II4 Mass. 323; State v. Horton.,
139 N. C. 588; Estell v. State, 51 N. J. L. 182. The distinction must rest,
on the one hand, on policy oppos~d to the admission in normal cases of the
ethical issue, and, on the other hand, to repugnance for "constructive crime."
The doctrine injects into the law a very broad question of ethics, upon which
reasonable men an; bound to differ. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
seems to have differed from that of North Carolina upon the moral aspects
of the liquor traffic, for, although they held intent to sell liquor without a
license supplied the necessary intent for conviction of selling adulterated liquor, they put it upon a repudiation of the malmn in se doctrine, at least
where the act intended is criminal and not merely tortious. State v. Stanton,
37 Conn. 421. Looking more closely at the principal case, it will be seen
that it may be said to-rest, not upon the ground that the sale of liquor is immoral, but upon the narrower ground that the sale of liquor with knowledge
that such sale is prohibited-that is to say, deliberate flouting of the law-·is
immoral. It will also be apparent that conviction might haYe rested upon
the principle of negligence, that one is bound to know what is a matter of
common knowledge. As Justice Holmes said in a similar case, "Common e..""<perience is necessary to the man of ordinary prudence, and a man who assumes to act as the defendant did must have it at his peril." Com. v. Pierce,
138 Mass. 165. See also, White v. State, 84 Ala. 421; State v. Hardie, 47
Ia. 647.
DAMAGts-~n1st.>oS1'!'10N 'tO Disr:Ast-PRoXIMA'rS CA:usr:.-Plaintiff fell
as result of the defendant's negligence. The evidence tended to show that
prior to the accident the ,plaintiff was in apparently good health but had a
latent tendency to ulcer of the stomach due to excessive acidity. After the
injury an ulcer developed. Defend.ant asked for an instruction negativing a
recovery since the injury merely caused an acceleration of the ulcer and
there was no evidence to show how much it was accelerated. Held, that the
instruction was properly refused. "Where, as here, the latent disease or
weakness did not cause pain, suffering, etc. to the plaintiff but such condition
plus the fall caused such pain, the fall and not the latent condition is the
proximate cause and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the entire damage
shown to haYe resulted from such fall." Hahn v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.
(N. ]., 1918), 105 Atl. 459.
There is a remark in Dulieu v. White [1901], 2 K. B. 669, 679, which is
very pertinent. In that case the defendant suffered a miscarriage as a resuit
of the fright caused by the defendant's negligence. The court there said
that it was immaterial that the defendant did not know her condition: "What
does the fact matter? If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently injured in his body it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had
not bad an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart." The sit11ation
in the principal case is precisely the same. In Vosburg v. Put11e'!.', 8o \Vis.
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523 the plaintiff's leg had to be amputated because of complications following the defendant's touching the plaintiff's shin. The theory of the defence
was predicated on the fact that the leg had previously been in a diseased
condition. But the court held the defendant liable and approved of the rule
that "the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the
wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him."
See alse> McNamara v. Village of Cli11to11ville, 62 Wis. 207-predisposition
to rheumatism making the illness more severe and prolonged; Baltimore City
Passenger l?.y. Cn. v. Kemp, 6r Md. 74-predisposition to cancer. In the last
case lhe court admitted that the predisposition was an intervening cause but
this did not render the defendant any less liable because the "defendant must
be supposed to know that it was the right of all classes of people, whether
diseased or otherwise. to be carried in their cars, and it must be supposed
that they knew that a personal injury inflicted upon anyone with predisposition or tendency to cancer might, and probably would, develop the disease."
To the same effect is Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274. 68 L. R A.
164; and cases cited in note 76 to Sec. 1244 of Su'.l'H£Rl.AND ON D~ACts (4th
ed.). It is a related question whether such latent conditions will affect recovery under the WORKM£N's CoMP£NSATlON Acrs. There is less harmony
among these latter cases. However, it would seem that the controlling principles are the ~ame, as was pointed out in the note in 3 MINN. L. RF.V. 125.
True enough, the causes are different, but it is difficult to see why they should
operate differently merely because the cause in the one case is a negligent
act and in the other it is the accident arising "out of and in the course of
employment." Once the accident is brought within the statute the que~tion
of cause is idelltical. Thus, recovery was allowed in Indianapolis Abbatoir
v. Coleman, 117 N. E. 502; and Lloyd v. Sugg [1900), I Q. B. 481. See
also the recent case of Wabash Ry. Co. v. bwustrial Com111issioti, l2I N. E.
569- (Feb., 1919). But the contrary was hel<l in Stombaugh v. Pierlcss Wire
Fence Co., 198 MK;h. 445. And compare Van Gorder v. Packard Mutorr:ar
Co., 195 Mich. 588.

·ca.

EMlN£NT DoMAIN-COMP£NSATION-T1M£ oF V AJ.UATlON.-Petition in eminent domain proceedings to take part of plaintiff's land was filed hy defendant in July, 1915. The trial to determine the land's value took place in Oc·
tober, 1917. The property had greatly enhanced in value in the interim, and
plaintiff claimed the increase. Held, one justice dissenting, the fixed rule
in Illinois gave compens~tion as of the time of filing the petition, no matter
what the value of the la,mj. became thereafter. City ()f Chicago v. Farwell
(Ill., 1919), 121 N. E. 795.
Owing to constitutional provision, the Uitiversal rule in eminent domain
proceedings is that the property appropriated is to be paid for at its value
at the time of the taking. Sweaney v. U.S., 62 Wis. 396; II L~WIS, EMIN!ONTDoM:AIN, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 70s. Where clear, tlie language- of the condemnation statute in the particular jurisdiction is decisive as to. when the taking
occurs. San Jose, etc. R. R. c~. v. Mayne, 8-3 Cal. 566; Laml>orn. v. Bell, 18°
Colo. 346. The datt' Qf filing the petition is in several states accepted as the
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time of the taking. Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Allison, 3I Ind. App. 50.
Others hold it to be the date of appraisement. Matter of FC1rs.vth Blvd.,
r27 Mo. 4r7. The dissenting opinion in the principal case contends for an
exception to the general Illinois rule in those cases where years elapse between the time of filing the petition and the beginning of the trial, on the
grounds that the nearer we get to paying the compensation with one hand,
while applying the axe with the other, the nearer we come to justice to all
the parties involved. See Parks v. City of Boston, 32 Mass. 198, 208. The
reverse of the question showed itself in Sotith Park Commissioners v. Dunlevy, 91 Ill. 49, where the property depreciated in value between the time of
filing the petition and the time of the trial. The representatives of the public
sought to change the rule of damages, bttt without success.
EvmtNcE-CRIMINAL LAW-!:MPEACHMtNT oF Di:;FtNDANT-OTH:CR CRIM£S.

-On cross-examination in a trial for murder the defendant, who had taken
the stand in his own behalf, was asked whether he had held up another man
and woman in another place of business at the point of a pistol and robbed
them. The defendant's previous testimony was to the effect that he had
come into the store to rob but not to kill; that he only fired at the deceased
after the latter had attempted to kill him. The question was asked to impeach the defendant's credibility on this point. Held, that the evidence was
competent since it tended to show that, instead of being a person who ·.vas
seeking to avoid taking life, he was one who cared not whether, in the accomplishment of his purpose, he did or did not kill a human being. Stale v.
Werner (La., 1919), 8o So. 596.
A defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf submits himself to
impeachment just as any other witness. Thottgh he can refuse to answer
concerning other crimes by a claim of self-incrimination-Saylor v. Com.:
monwealth, 97 Ky. 184-yet he is subject to the ordinary rules of evidence if
he does not invoke that privilege. It is established that other crimes are not
admissible in the trial of a particular issue although the exceptions to the
rule have modified it to a considerable degree. But, whether the crimes are
admissible to prove motive, identity, system or plan, it must still appear that
they are connected with the present crime. State v. Hale, 156 Mo. 102;
Bafo v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 635; Rosensweig v. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.), 634.
If the exception laid down by the principal case were accepted it would mean
that the exception would swallow the rule so that it would vanish altogether.
The theory upon which the evidence is admitted in the principal case is that
the statement of the defendant is inconsistent with actual existing fact-it
is an inconsistent statement and hence admissible. But is not all impeaching
testimony used to disclose a. state of facts contradicting the declaration of
the witness? This would result in the admission of other crimes whether
connected with the issue or not-so long as it could be used to impeach the
credibility of the witness. To allow an exception, then, that other crimes
can be used to impeach credibility amounts to making the exception the rule.
But it seems that a few cases have erroneously recognized this broad exception. People v. Pete, 123 Cal. 373. See also Jackson·v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 28r.
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EvmENCE-'l'RANSAC'tIONS WITH DECEASED PERSONS.-The plaintiff, claiming as assignee of a life insurance policy taken out by her late husband, was
allowed to testify as to personal transactions between herself and the insured,
for the purpose of proving the assignment. Held, that such evidence was
proper. Ward v. New York Life Ins. Co. (N. Y., 1919), 122 N. E. 207.
There is some conflict of authority on the question whether such evidence
comes within the terms of statutes prohibiting such testimony in actions
against decedent's estates. In Franken v. Order of Foresters, 152 Mich. 502,
evidence of this nature was held incompetent, although the contest was
between different beneficiaries and the estate of the insured would
not in any event receive the money.
This case was adversely criticised in Savage v. Modern Woodmeµ, 84 Kan. 63, where the decisiQn was explained as the result of "excluding witnesses who are within the reason of
the statutory rule, although not within its terms, while the general practice
and the practice in this state is to the contrary." In a number of cases the
rule has been laid down that beneficiaries named in insurance policies are
not disqualified under the statute from testifying as to transactions with the
deceased. Grand Lodge v. Dillard (Tex. Cr.) 162 S. W. 1173; Ericksoii v.
Modern Woodmen, 43 Wash. 242; Sherret v. Royal Clan, 37 Ill. App. 446;
Shuman v. Knights of Honor, 110 Ia. 48o; Hamill v. Royal Arca111mi, 152
Pa. 537; Macaitlay v. National Bank, 27 S. C. 215. But the principal case,
while relying on a number of the cases here cited, goes farther than any of
them, since it deals with a case of assignment by the deceased to the plaintiff. The court is evidently in sympathy with Mr. Wigmore's severe criticism of the policy of the statute. 1 W1GMoru; ON EVIDENCE, Sec. 578.
0

HUSBAND AND WIFE-SUIT BY WIFE FOR CoN!;ORTIUM.-Plaintiff's husband
was severely and permanently injured through the negligence of Defendant.
Plaintiff sues to recover for the loss of her husband's companionship and
support, occasioned by the injury. Held, (one justice dissenting) plaintiff
could not recover, even though her common law disabilities had been removed
by statute. Bernhardt v. Perry (Mo., 1918), 2o8 S. W. 462.
For a discussion of this question as t~ whether the wife, emancipated by
statute, is entitled to sue for the loss of consortium, see the notes in 14 M1cH.
L. R.Ev. 689 and 12 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 72.
JURY-How FAR THE CoURT MAY GO IN URGING AGREEMENT.-The jury
went to the jury room to consider their verdict at 1 :30 p. m. The next. day
at noon they reported a disagreement and asked to be discharged. The judge
told them that the court could transact no business unless it could get verdicts; that they were as good a jury as could be obtained·; that he appreciated
their desire to get home, but the county which had stood the expense of the
trial ought not to lose the benefit of it if an agreement was reasonably possible; that he would not force an agreement even if he could, but he thought
a further consideration might bring them together; and he asked them to
try again. This was substantially repeated at the close of the afternoon session. The next afternoon they brought in a verdict. Held, the language of
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the court was improper, inasmuch as it suggested an agreement as a means
to save expense, thus "deprivit:tg them of that freedom which the law contemplates they should exercise in reaching a verdict." The verdict was set
aside. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Barber (Commission of Appeals of
Te.xas, 1919), 209 S. W. 394This is a very extreme case. In Fleck v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (Tex.
Civ. App.), 191 S. W. 386, an almost identical reference to the e.""<:pense of the
trial was held proper. In Kelly v. Emery, 75 Mich. 147, the court said to the
jury: "This case has already been tried once, and the amount involved is
not large, and the parties cannot afford to litigate it forever, and the county
cannot afford to have them do it. You see it takes some time to try the
case, and I hope you will be able to arrive at ~ ~onclu~ion and settle the
facts in the case, at least." This was held to be entirely proper. In 1-Vatsoii
v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 551, it was held proper to urge the
jury to inake every honest effort to agree because another trial would make
expense to the county and to the parties. In Knickerbocker Ice Ca. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 253 Pa. 54, it was held proper to urge the jury to agree
in view of t\le length of time coµsum,ed in t,he trial and the amount of testimpny ~eard.
¥A~TI'..R A."\p

S:ERvAN'£-fuLA'l'ION.-Plaintiff, an employee of defendant,
days d,iscontinuance of his work because of an inji;red foot,
rel;_tffn~d to h,is. place o~ employment, arriving there about 15 or 20 minutes
be.fw~ h~ work ordinarily comq1enced. He did not at this time apply for
his worlc cai;-d, noi- did he gq for his tools, but went into a small shack to
warm, this shack being used for such purpose by the workmen with defendapl;'S; ~q.wledge and acquiescence. While here the stove fell, injuring plaintiff,_ "!t:t.<l ~his su_it i& brollf;ht to re~-0ver for such injury. Held, defendant
at the tim,e <?.f ~ injury owed no duty to plaintiff with reference to the
stovt)J the r~l~t.WI.J. of master and Sel"Vant not then exis.ting. Flaniga1~ v.
K;. C., $.Ry., (~e., 1919), ~ S. W. 441.
.
No doubt can arise as. to the pi;opi;iety of this decision,. for though ~n
so~c; C<\Ses th~ qu~tion wh~ther the relation of master ~nd, serva11t ~xisted
i~ \eft to the jury, ~uch is not the rule when the evidence. is as conclusive
as it is here. In the case of a workman who begins his labors a,t a certain hou1
in the morning there is necessarily a time when he is on the premises of the
ma~ter going to. his work, and prepar~g for his w 0 rk :;ts by washing his
hands, procuring his tqols, or changing his clothes. "All these requirements
are incident to the employme1.lt, and i~ is ~ei;efoi:e h,eld t~at the r~la~iqn of
master and s.eryant continm:s from 9-. :i:eason~ble ti~ ~ef-0r-e th.e actual ~
ginning of w-or-k u~til a :reaso.nal>l~ tilt\e subseq11en.t th,ereto." Lyo1a v. Pe-0ple's So:l!i.ngs. Ban.k, 251 Pa. s®,. In the English case o.f Sha.rp. v. 1cJlmso~~
& Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 13g, cited with approval in. the- pr-li.i.cipal case th,e cour-t
held that the relation existed when ~n emplG_yee, ~ri;iving on hi.~ employ-ei:'s
premises 20 minutes befol.'e he was: to beg:in work, wa!? inh1i;ed. it beipg show~
that it was custotna.ry· for the w.-0i;~me~ to arr-~veo as early a.s this, and upon
·ari-iving to deposit their tkk;ets a..t: th~ office and go to tI:ie UleSs cabin for
after
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refreshment. Where the plaintiff reached his employer's building 5 or IO
minutes before his period of employment was to begin, and haying taken the
elevator to get his working clothes was injured by the negligence of the elevator operator whom he was to relieve, the court held that at the time of
the injury the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant. Lyons v. Pcople'.r
Bank, sz1pra. In an earlier case in the same court where a workman was
injured b,Y the explosion of a boiler at his place of employment, which oc•
curred ten to thirty minutes before the hour for commencing work, it being
the habit to use the time between his arrival and starting work in oiling and
getting ready his machine, it was held that the question whether he had arrived at the works within a reasonable time was a question for the jury; and
the jury having found that the relation of master and servant did exist at
the time, their finding was sustained. Walbert v. Tre%ler, 156 Pa. St. n2.
For ah annotation of cases involving the question whether the relation was
existing, see 13 NEGJ.lGENCS AND CoMPENSATION CASES, ANNOTATED, 630.
TAXATION-RIGHT OF STATE TO SEI.I. PROPERTY OF MUNlCIPAI.ITY FOR TAXss.-The land in question had been assessed for taxes and the assessment roll
had been confirmed by the city council twenty days before the city bought
the land on which it erected an engine house for its fire department. The
state and county taxes were ~returned delinquent to the auditor general. In
the usual manner at the tax sale the state bid in the property and later the
plaintiff got tax deeds to the land fr.om the state. All notices required by
the statute were given by the plaintiff, but the city neither repaid the plaintiff
nor demanded a reconveyance after tender. In a petition for a writ of assistance to obtain possession of the land, it was held that the land was not
exempted from taxes because subsequently put to a municipal purpose, ·and
that tl1e city was in the position of any other negligent owner. (Brooke and
Kuhn, JJ., dissenting.) PetiJion of Auditor General (Mich., 1918), 170 N.
w. 549.
In general if the municipality bought and applied the land to a use which
exempted the lot from taxation before the lien for taxes against the land
was perfected, then the liability .of the land to taxation was arrested and the
lot could not be sold for taxes ; the theory being that none had legally accrued,
Laurel\'. Weems (19n), 100 Miss. 335, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 159; Territory of
Arizona v. Perrin (1905), 9 Ariz. 316; Gachet v. New Orleans (1900), 52 La.
Ann. 813, L. R. A. 1915 C 129. If a lien for taxes had attached before the
municipality bought the land, the state then giving ..a tax deed for the delinquent taxes, the power of the state so to sell the land is questioned. Some
cases, however, do not consider the question of the power of the state to sell,
but say that if the lien once attaches, then purchase by the municipality does
not exempt the land from taxes, Pubiic Schools &c. v. O'Con11or (1go6),
143 Mich. 35; Pu;yallup v. Lakfo (1907), 45 Wash. 368. But in other cases
the power of the state to give a valid tax title is questioned on the ground that
the municipality having the title of the grantor, holds such title as agent of
the state, and that there is a merger of the tax title of the state with this
title which the municipality obtained, Graham v. Detroit (1913), 174 Mich.
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538, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836; Foster v. Dufath (1913), 120 Minn. 484, 48 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 70'/· The instant case recognised this doctrine, but distingutshed
Graham v. Detroit, supra, saying that the merger occurred only when the
municipality acted as agent of the state, and that in the instant case there was
no merger, -for the city was acting in regard to the fire department, a purely
local matter, Davidson v. Hine (1go8), 151 Mich. 294, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57.5.
It would seem that the courts should hold that there is a merger of the twOI
titles when it can be conceded that the municipality is acting as agent of the
state. On the other hand when the municipility acts in a matter of local
rather than general interest, it would seem that the courts would divide, even
as they differ on the question of legislative control over municipalities in
-matter ·of local concern to the latter. Michigan has upheld the doctrine of
- home rule and the right of local self government for cities, People e:: rel
Le Roy v. Hierlbut (1871), 24 Mich. 44; Davidson v. Hine, supra. On the related question of municipal liability for the tort of its fire department, other
courts have held that there was no liability on the ground that the fire department is a matter of general concern rather than of local interest; Burrell
v. City of Augusta (1886), 78 Me. n8; Smith v. City of Rochester (1879),
76 N. Y. 506; Frederick v. City of Columbus (18g8), 58 Oh. St. 538. From
a practical and judicial point of view, however, it is often difficult to deterinine whether a given case is of locaf or general concern. Distinctions on
this basis are bound tq give trouble, for municipal acts usually have two aspects: when primarily governmental and public in their nature and purpose,
still they are incidentally a benefit to the municipality, and the reverse is also
true.

WILI.S-.PATENT AMBIGUITY-DESIGNATION OF DEVISES. Paragraphs 2 to 7
of testator's will were devoted to devises of lands; paragraphs 8 to 15, to bequests of personalty. ·Paragraph 16, devising certain real property to "my
son John S. Bruce,'' ended iri the middle of a line, and paragraph 17, beginning with a capital letter, gave the residue "to have and to hold to him his
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns." Held, that the scheme of the
will and the apparent independence of each preceding paragraph would not
permit of construing paragraphs 16 and 17 together; that paragraph 17 therefore name no legatee and a patent ambiguity existed to remedy which parol
evidence was inadmissible. Bruce v. Bmce, (N. J. Ch., 1918) 105 Atl. 492.
The conclusions of the court are by no means free from difficulty. Conceding that the two paragraphs in question were not related structurally, that
fact would not necessarily preclude construing them as connected in meaning.
In Kuehle v. Zimmer. 249 Ill. 544. paragraphs wholly independent both as to
arrangement in the will and as to express subject matter, were read together
because of an inference deduced from particular words used in one of them.
The distinction invoked by the decision of the principal case between patent
and latent ambiguities as a ground for the admission of extrinsic evidence in
aid of the interpretation of wills is universally recognized. But the application of the' rule has more than once taxed the ingenuity as well as the wisdom
of the legal profession. In Hunt v. Hort, 3 Bro. C. C. 3n, it was held that a
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bequest to "Lady
" was not to be supplemented by parol and Ba31lis
v. Attonze:.v Gener.-il, 2 Atk:. 239, is to the same effect. Such an expression in
a will would seem the equivalent of a complete blank as denoting that the
testator had not yet decided upon the legatee. Yet the court allowed affidavits
to help expain which of three granddaughters the testator intended should
take under devise to "my granddaughter
." Goods of Hubb11ck,
92 L. T. N. S. 665.
If, in the principal case, the word "him" may be construed as a blank space
(see cases supra) or as if description had been omitted by mistake or inadvertence (Engeltlzaler v. Engeltlzaler, 1g6 Ill. 230; Karsten v. Karsten, 254 Ill.
480; Haw111aii v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30; Davis v. Davis, 8 Mo. 56; Crooks v.
Wliitford, 47 Mich. 283; 1 JARMAN, Wrr,LS, [3rd Am. Ed.] c. 14, p. 350) the
holding is undoubtedly supported by the weight of authority. But the right
so to disregard a personal pronoun is seriously challenged by the opinion fa
Eichorn v. M orat, 175 Ky. So, 193 S. W. 1013. In that case the testatrix made
a will of one paragraph which contained no other designation of the beneficiary than was supplied by the term "he." The court advanced, in part, the
following interpretation to justify the admission of extrinsic evidence: "In
the instant case it would be wholly incompetent to show by extrinsic proof
that the testatrix meant by the use of the personal pronoun "he" a female
to whom the word used did not apply*** It (to ascertain by extrinsic proof
the person here referred to) does no violence to the rule against the substitution .of a devisee when none is mentioned.*** It is true that in the case
we now have the pronoun "he" which the testatrix employed might be applied to a great many persons, but when it is remembered that**** the same
might be said with ~reference to the name "John"*** we are unable to distinguish and logical reason why the rule should not be applied in the one
case as well at the other*** The two cases exhibit a difference in degree
only, and not in kind."
WORK AND LABOR-CONTRACT TO PAY BY L1'GACY-RIGHTS OF LEGATEE. p
worked as a servant for D'~ testator under an eXpress agreement that her
services would be compensated by a legacy. P declined to accept the legacy
provided by the testator and sued for the reasonable value of her services.
Held, P could recover. Shemetzer v. Broegler, (N. J. 1918) 105 Atl. 450.
Recovery was allowed under similar circumstances in Reynolds v. Robinson,
64 N. Y. 589, the court holding that plaintiff could accept the legacy and also
maintain suit for the difference between the legacy and the reasonable value
of the services. But in Lee's Appeal, 53 Conn. 363, it was held that any legacy,
however small, complied with the terms of the contract and precluded recovery on the basis of a quantum meriiit. The New York case and the instant
case in effect enunciate the same rule, which may be called the rule of reasonable construction. The Connecticut case enunciates the rule of strict construction; it enforces the contract exactly as made by the parties and refuses to
read into the contract any terms not incorporated therein by the parties. The
courts would have avoided much difficulty in application if the doctrine of
strict construction had been consistently maintained. The New York court
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has in other types of cases shown marked liberality in reading into an otherwise absolute contractual provision the word 'reasonable' or its equivalent; for
example, in the builders' contract cases where an architect's certificate is
stipulated for it has been held that the production of such certificate is excused when it is disclosed that the architect has refused unreasonably or capriciously. Bowery National Bank v. The Mayor, etc. of New York, 63
N. Y. 336; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648. This doctrine has been generally
followed. Batchelor v. Kirkbride 26 Fed 899; Michaelis v. Wolf, 1.36 Ill. 6&;
Chism v. Schipper, 51 N. J. L. 1. New York has also shown liberality where
an action is brought on an insurance policy which provided for a certificate of
a specific person as a condition precedent t-0 the recovery of a loss under the
1J0'1icy, Lang v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, where the certificate of the
notary living nearest the place of fire was required, and it was held that on
·his refusal to act it was sufficient if the insured furnished to the insurer a
certificate of the nearest notary who consents to act. This decision, however,
is out ·of accord with the great weight of authority. W orslry v. Wood, ·6 T. R.
710; Johnson v. Phoenix Insur. Ca., 112 Mass. 49; Colitmbia fos11r. Co. v.
Lawrence, 35 U. S. 10; Protection Insur. Co. v. Pherson, 5 Ind. 417; Leadbetter v. Etna Insur. Co., 13 Me. 265. In view of the fact that it is the duty
of courts to enforce the contracts as made by the parties and not to make or
change their contracts, the ·strict rule of Lee's Appeal, supra, seems preferable
to that of the instant case.

